Carl Schleicher, A Question About the Talmud, oil on canvas, c. 1860–71.Private collection
עבודה זרה ז, א
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַנִּשְׁאָל לְחָכָם וְטִימֵּא — לֹא יִשָּׁאֵל לְחָכָם וִיטַהֵר, לְחָכָם וְאָסַר — לֹא יִשָּׁאֵל לְחָכָם וְיַתִּיר
The sages taught: In the case of one who asks a question of a sage with regard to an issue of ritual impurity and the sage rules that the item is impure, he may not ask the same question of another sage and have him rule that it is pure. Similarly, in the case of one who asks a sage a halachic question and he deems it forbidden, he may not ask the question of another sage and have him deem it permitted.
There is a parallel ruling elsewhere in the Talmud:
נדה כ,ב
חכם שטימא אין חברו רשאי לטהר אסר אין חבירו רשאי להתיר
In the case of a halachic authority who deemed an item impure, another halachic authority is not allowed to deem it pure; if one halachic authority deemed a matter prohibited, another halachic authority is not allowed to deem it permitted
These ruling of the Talmud seem straightforward and easy to understand: don’t shop around for a rabbi who will give you the answer that you are looking for. But Rabbi Moshe Isserlis, the Rema, understood this passage with a slight twist. The prohibition of asking for a “second halakhic opinion” is only when the first ruling is kept secret. But if the second sage is aware that another has already ruled in the case, there is no prohibition in asking for a second (or a third, or a fourth) opinion, and the Rema ruled that this was normative practice for Ashkenazi Jews:
שולחן ערוך יורה דעה 242:31
כל תלמיד חכם שדעותיו מכוונות אינו מדבר בפני מי שגדול ממנו בחכמה אע"פ שלא למד ממנו כלום: הגה ואין לאדם להורות עד ארבעים שנה אם יש גדול ממנו בעיר אף על פי שאינו רבו (ב"י בשם הר"ן וסמ"ק ורש"י פרק הנחנקין) . חכם שאסר אין חבירו רשאי להתיר משקול הדעת אבל אם יש לו קבלה שטעה או שטעה בדבר משנה יוכל להתיר ואפילו אם טעה בשקול הדעת יכול לישא וליתן עם המורה עד שיחזור בו ולכן אין איסור לשואל [לשאול] לשני ובלבד שיודיע אותו שכבר הורה הראשון לאסור (רבינו ירוחם נתיב ב' ותוס' ורא"ש) ואפי' אם התיר הראשון וכבר חלה הוראתו אין לשני לאסור מכח שקול הדעת (כן משמע באשיר"י פרק קמא דעבודת כוכבים) וכל זה באותה הוראה עצמה אבל במעשה אחר פשיטא שיכול להורות מה שנראה אליו (מהרי"ק שורש קע"ב וחדושי רשב"א וע"פ)
…There is no prohibition in asking for a second halahkic opinion so long as the second sage is aware that another has already issued a ruling that forbade.
The Reasons for the Prohibition
Regardless of the later ruling of the Rema, early Rishonim were divided as to the reason that shopping for a psak was not permitted.
The earliest Rishon to rule on the issue appears to be the Ra’avad, Rabbi Avraham ben David (1125-1198):
חכם שטימא אין חבירו רשאי לטהר אסר אין חבירו רשאי להתיר ,ואם התירו אינו מותר
Two centuries later, in his own explanation on the Talmud, Rabbenu Nissim (1320-1376) cited the Ra’avad, and added what he thought to be the reason: The first prohibitive ruling turns the object into one that is now forbidden.
ר"ן על עבודה זרה א׳ ב
הנשאל לחכם וטימא לא ישאל לחכם ויטהר וכו'. כתב הראב"ד ז"ל בפירוש מס' ע"ז שלו דלא משום כבודו של ראשון נגעו בה אלא משום דכיון דאסרה ראשון שויה חתיכה דאיסורא ושוב אין לה היתר דאפילו התירה שני אינה מותרת
Somehow, the first ruling leaves a lasting and indelible impression on the object, such that a later permissive ruling is of no effect.
But according to Rabbenu Nissim, there is no such spell cast upon the object by the first ruling. Instead, he suggests two reasons that psak shopping is forbidden. First, it would be an affront to the honor of the first sage to have his ruling ignored, and second, the existence of two conflicting rulings would leave the impression that there exited two sets of rules, or as he put it, two Torot:
מפני כבודו של ראשון ועוד כדי שלא תראה תורה כשתי תורות הללו אוסרים והללו מתירים
How to justify going shopping for a psak
As Rabbi Yosie Levine notes in his excellent recent biography of Hakham Tsevi Ashkenazi, there were any number of reasons that would permit submitting a query to multiple authorities, or appealing a psak once it had been rendered. Here are a few:
1) The prohibition is on the respondent, not one the questioner.
This is the position of Tosafot in Niddah:
תוספית נדה כ, ב, ד׳ה אגמריה
הנשאל לחכם וטימא לא ישאל לחכם ויטהר וי"ל דקפידא לא הויא אשואל אלא אחכם אבל השואל ישאל כל מה שירצה דמתוך כך ידקדקו בדבר ופעמים שהראשון טועה ויצא הדבר לאורה
…this only applies to the sage, and not the petitioner. The petitioner may ask whomever he wishes, because the more he asks, the better is his understanding…
2) The Prohibition only applies if the first sage ruled stringently
This, as we have seen, is the position of the Ra’avad: “חכם שטימא אין חבירו רשאי לטהר אסר אין חבירו רשאי להתיר ,ואם התירו אינו מותר”. But if the first sage ruled leniently (and of course, strictness and lenience is often in the eye of the beholder), all bets are off and the petitioner may ask again, and again.
3) It only applies if the second sage was unaware of a prior ruling
This is the position of Tosafot in Chullin (44b). A story is told that Rav was about to declare that a piece of meat was not kosher, but later, the same case came before Rabbah bar bar Channah who permitted it. According to Tosafot, this case of shopping for a psak was permitted because Rabbah bar bar Channah was not aware of Rav’s (impending) decision: “לא ידע שאסר חבירו”.
4) It Does not apply if the second sage had a traditional ruling about the issue.
As we have seen, this is the position of the Rema, who ruled it into normative Ashkenazi practice (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה 242:31 ):
חכם שאסר אין חבירו רשאי להתיר משקול הדעת אבל אם יש לו קבלה שטעה …יוכל להתיר
If one sage prohibited, another may not permit through his own reasoning. But if the second has a received teaching that the first was in error, he may indeed permit.
5) It Does not apply if the second sage is somehow “greater” thaN the first
Rabbi Shabtei ben Meir Hakohen (1621-1662) wrote an important commentary to the Shulchan Aruch called the Siftei Kohen (שפתי כהן). To this day, it is printed right along side the text in all the standard editions, and in it, he opined that if the second sage was greater, (and who, exactly, is the arbiter of that?) he may overrule a prior psak:
שפתי כהן שולחן ערוך יורה דעה 242:53
אבל כל שהוא אינו חבירו שהוא גדול ממנו רשאי להתיר מה שאסר הראשון עכ"ל וכן דעת הר"ן שם וכ"כ ר' ירוחם נתיב ב' ח"ה דכל זה מיירי בששניהם שוים דאם הא' גדול מחבירו בחכמה יכול להתיר מה שאסר חבירו אפי' במידי דתליא בסברא ע"כ
6) It does not apply after the medieval period
Perhaps the most radical of rabbinic reinterpretations of this passage in today’s page of Talmud is found in the Aruch Hashulchan of the great Lithuanian Rabbi Yechiel Michael Epstein (1825-1908):
ערוך השולחן יורה דעה 242:63
ודע שלא נמצא דין זה, דחכם שאסר אין חבירו יכול להתיר, לא ברמב"ם ולא בטור. והרי גמרא מפורשת היא בכמה מקומות. ולא ראיתי מי שהעיר בזה. והנראה לעניות דעתי: דסבירא להו לרבותינו אלה דעכשיו אחר שנתפשטו ספרי הש"ס והפוסקים – לא שייך כלל דין זה. שהרי כבר נתבאר דדין זה אינו אלא כשנחלקו בסברא בעלמא. ועכשיו אין לך דבר הוראה שאין לה ראיה מאיזה גמרא או איזה פוסק, ורחוק הוא בכלל להורות בסברא בעלמא
We should note that this ruling - that a sage may not permit that which another had forbidden - is not found in either the Rambam nor the Tur, and yet it is a clear ruling of the Talmud in several different places. I think this is because the Rambam and the Tur believed that in their days, after the text of the Talmud and the rulings of the sages became widely known, this ruling was no longer applicable. As we have seen the injunction only applied when there was a difference of opinion; but today every opinion is supported by a passage in the Talmud or a legal ruling, and it is extremely unusual for a psak to be based on an unsupported opinion…
“...the law was intended only to limit authorities who were rendering halakhic decisions on the basis of logic alone; once the Talmud and codes had been promulgated, there was no issue for which an authority would not have recourse to textual proof, thus rendering moot the original injunction”
Shopping for a Get - in early modern Europe
In his biography of the Hakham Tsevi, Yosie Levine has a deep dive into the 1706 divorce of Asher Anshul Cohen, which took place in London, under the eye of Rabbi Aaron Uri Hart, rabbi of the Great Synagogue there. Cohen was “an inveterate gambler who intended to escape from his creditors by fleeing to the West Indies.” But before doing so, he gave his wife a conditional get, which was not unusual. It allowed her to remarry if he was to be lost at sea - a real possibility back then. But “in actuality, it was more likely a clever strategy to protect the assets of the husband by transferring them to the wife. So as to not attract attention to his surreptitious plan, Cohen arranged for the divorce to be conducted privately.”
For reasons that are not entirely clear, the case came to the attention of Rabbi Mordechai Hamburger, (whose mechutenet was of Gluckl of Hameln). He objected to many aspects: the fact that the get was conditional, that it had been written by a Sephardi scribe with no experience, and that it had been written in English rather than Aramaic. For good measure, he also objected to the witnesses.
The best defense is a good offense, so Rabbi Hart convened a Bet Din to review Hamburger’s objections. It met in Hamburger’s absence, found his objections to the get unwarranted, and placed him and his wife into herem.
Hamburger then appealed to Rabbi David Nieto of London, who told him to seek the psak of the Hakham Tsevi, then in Altona. He also involved Rabbi Judah Loeb Harif of Amsterdam and Rabbi Judah Loeb of Rotterdam. (Yes I know, two Rabbis named Judah Loeb. There will be a third. Stay with me). Hakham Tsevi and the two Rabbis Judah all opined that the herem against Hamburger had no validity.
Rabbi Hart of London was now furious, and to defend his original herem against Hamburger he published an entire pamphlet which refuted all of the arguments of Hakham Tsevi, although he conceded that he was outnumbered and outgunned and accepted the decision of Hamburger’s defenders.
Despite Rabbi Hart conceding, Hamburger did what all good wealthy Jews do when they don’t like their rabbi: he opened a breakaway shul in his own home. This aroused yet more uninvited rabbinic intervention: Rabbi Loeb Kalish (there, that’s the third rabbi with the name Loeb) issued a new ban against Hamburger, and reported that no fewer than six other rabbis agreed with his position (including, are you ready for this, a Rabbi Judah Loeb of Grodzisk - that’s the third Rabbi Judah Loeb in the story). Meanwhile Rabbi Nathan Halperin, who later became the Av Bet Din of the important communities of Altona-Hamburg-Wandsbeck, couldn’t resist and joined in, issuing a ruling in defense of Hamburger (who was….a relative of his; you can’t make this up).
One big happy virtual bet Hamidrash
Let’s give the last word to Rabbi Yosie Levine, on whose analysis we have been leaning. He gave a rather upbeat assessment of this whole shopping for a psak thing, and described it as one big happy evolving Bet Hamidrash:
As long as the words of the first sage have not been actualized in practice, the second sage or any authority thereafter-maintains license to contribute his halakhic opinion. This was the position of Hakham Tsevi. It is a small leap to conclude that dispatching letters to multiple respondents created a kind of virtual beit midrash in which halakhic possibilities were not foreclosed simply by the issuance of the first response. Though separated by geographical distance, the parties involved tacitly understood that they were in conversation with one another, particularly when a questioner had written or insinuated that he had consulted other rabbis. If a given authority knew that his was not the only address to which a query had been dispatched, he could orient his response accordingly. He implicitly conceived of his responsum not as a formal ruling, but as an opinion intended to advance the greater halakhic conversation. In the early modern period, a respondent could safely assume that his word would not be the final one.
And if that was true of the early modern period, it is certainly an even better description of contemporary Orthodoxy.
