Ketuvot 15a ~ Talmudic Probability Theory I

תלמוד בבלי כתובות דף טו עמוד א 

  א"ר זירא: כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי ..מנא ליה לר' זירא הא? ...מתשע חנויות, כולן מוכרות בשר שחוטה ואחת בשר נבלה, ולקח מאחת מהן ואינו יודע מאיזה מהן לקח - ספיקו אסור, ובנמצא - הלך אחר הרוב, 

R. Zera said: Any doubt about something that is fixed in its place is considered be a fify-fifty chance...  Where does he learn this from ? [From a Baraisa which teaches the following. Consider a town in which] there are nine shops, all of which sell kosher meat, and one store that sells sells meat that is not kosher.  If a person bought meat from one of these [ten] stores but he cannot recall from which, his doubt means that the meat is forbidden. But if he found a piece of meat [in the street and he cannot tell from which store it came] he may follow the majority [and assume the meat is kosher]...  

As Dov Gabbay and Moshe Koppel noted in their 2011 paper, there is something odd about talmudic probability. If we find some meat in an area where there are p kosher stores and q non-kosher stores, then all other things being equal, the meat is kosher if and only if p > q.This is clear from the parallel text in Hullin (11a) where the underlying principal is described as זיל בתר רובא – follow the majority. Or as Gabbay and Koppel explain it:

Given a set of objects the majority of which have the property P and the rest of which have the property not-P, we may, under certain circumstances, regard the set itself and/or any object in the set as having property P.
— Gabbay and Koppel 2010

In other words, what happens is that if there are more kosher stores than there are trief, the meat is considered to have become kosher. It's not that the meat is most likely to be kosher and may therefore be eaten.  Rather it takes on the property of being kosher

We encountered another example of talmudic probability theory only a week ago, on Ketuvot 9a. There, a newly-wed husband claims that his wife was not a virgin on her wedding night. The Talmud argues that his claim needs to be set into a context of probabilities:

  1. She was raped before her betrothal.
  2. She was raped after her betrothal.
  3. She had intercourse of her own free will before her betrothal.
  4. She had intercourse of her own free will after her betrothal.

Since it is only the last of these that renders her forbidden to her husband (stay focussed and don't raise the question of a husband who is a Cohen), the husband's claim is not supported, based on the probabilities. Here is how Gubbay and Koppel explain the case - using formal logic:

Detail from Gabbay paper.jpg

Oh, and the reference to Bertrand's paradox? That is the paradox in which some questions about probability - even ones that seem to be entirely mathematical, have more than one correct solution; it all depends on how you think about the answer. One if its formulations goes like this: Given a circle, find the probability that a chord chosen at random will be longer than the side of an inscribed equilateral triangle. Turns out there are three correct solutions. Gubbay and Koppel claim that just like that paradox, the solution to many talmudic questions of probability will have more than one correct answer, depending on how you think about that answer.

Rabbi Nahum Eliezer Rabinovitch (b.1928) is the Rosh Yeshiva of the hesder Yeshivah Birkat Moshe in Ma'ale Adumim.  (He also has a PhD. in the Philosophy of Science from the University of Toronto, published in 1973 as Probability and Statistical Inference in Ancient and Medieval Jewish Literature.)  Rabbi Rabinovitch seems to have been the first to point out the relationship between Bertrand's paradox and talmudic probability theory in his 1970 Biometrika paper Combinations and Probability in Rabbinic Literature. There, the Rosh Yeshiva wrote that "the rabbis had some awareness of the different conceptions of probability as a measure of relative frequencies or a state of general ignorance."

James Franklin, in his book on the history of probability theory, notes that codes like the Talmud (and the Roman Digest that was developed under Justine c.533) "provide examples of how to evaluate evidence in cases of doubt and conflict.  By and large, they do so reasonably. But they are almost entirely devoid of discussion on the principles on which they are operating." But it is unfair to expect the Talmud to have developed a notion of probability theory as we have it today. That wasn't its interest or focus. Others have picked up this task, and have explained the statistics that is the foundation of  talmudic probability. For this, we have many to thank, including the Rosh Yeshiva, Rabbi Rabinovitch שליט׳א.

(The [Roman] Digest and) the Talmud are huge storehouses of concepts, and to be required to have an even sketchy idea of them is a powerful stimulus to learning abstractions.
— James Franklin. The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal, 349.
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